Re: Defaults

=> gemini://jorgesanz.net/posts/2023-11-16-defaults/

This should be amusing.

• Mail Server: OpenSMTPD.
• Mail Client: mutt(1) plus some scripting to pull from the server maildir to my laptop.
• Notes: vi(1)
• To-Do: vi ~/todo
• Phone Photo Shooting: (nope. no phone.)
• Photos Management: cp(1), mv(1), rm(1), etc.
• Calendar: at(1)
• Calendar Backend: cron(8)
• Cloud File Storage: an OpenBSD virt "in the cloud", so "Berkeley Fast File System", but that's not what they meant by "cloud". so, nope. git, rsync, and sftp pretty much suffice for my remote file needs.
• RSS: (nope)
• Contacts Management: vi ~/.muttrc
• Browser: amfora, w3m(1)
• Chat: com (as found on sdf.org), irssi(1)
• Bookmarks: vi ~/.ow/shortcuts
• Read-it-Later: vi ~/todo
• Word Processing: vi
• Shopping List: write things on a sticky note (so, nope)
• Meal Planning: (nope)
• Budgeting and finance: (nope)
• News: w3m
• Music: LMMS, lilypond, mpv --no-video
• Podcast: JavaScript apps make it hard to get the *.mp3 with w3m. so, nope. There is gemini://kwiecien.us/gemcast/ but that's downloading with amfora† and playing with mpv, which differs little from downloading a PDF and then using mupdf on it.
• Password Management: (your security clearance is not high enough)
• Photo Editing: convert(1) or sometimes Imager.pm

† amfora is modified to make executing programs a trifle more difficult, and reading from or writing to most of the filesystem is likewise difficult. So there's no "amfora runs program P for download D" like you might see in a normal browser that has a dubious security record. w3m has similar modifications, because again browsers have dubious security records and it might be bad if an attacker could easily read your ~/.ssh keys or whatever.

=> amfora.patch