My article "Two senses of representation in science" is now published! It's open access. Short summary below. 🧵
https://ojs.ehu.eus/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/26040
https://ojs.ehu.eus/index.php/THEORIA/issue/view/2115
[#]philsci #philosophyofscience
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Philosophers have been debating for some time about what makes a scientific model a representation of something (is the model structure decisive, or only user intentions?) and what a model is exactly (an abstract entity, a fictional system?). In this article, I argue that in order to respond, we must first acknowledge that there are two levels at which these questions can be asked: the conctete (user) level and the abstract (communal) level, and the responses are different in each case. 1/3
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By analogy, we can ask what a city map (a sheet of paper) represents for someone in a concrete case, or what a map published by an editor represents in general. In the first case, the map is a concrete object standing for another object (the city) and user intentions determine how the two relate. In the second case, the map is a kind of object with many copies, and norms of use determine how it relates to potential targets of representation. These two levels are interdependent. 2/3
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This is the analog of user-meaning vs conventional-meaning in philosophy of language. I believe that most accounts of representation presented so far suffer from not making clearly this distinction and either mixing aspects of the two levels or neglecting one of the two. I criticise in particular user-centred accounts and fictionalist accounts on this ground. If we analyse the two levels separately, we get a finer account. 3/3
https://ojs.ehu.eus/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/26040
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